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While we understand less about how cities work than we do about ant colonies, however, we 
confidently develop and implement dirigiste urban policies.  We do so with no real understanding of 
how the policies will eventually impact on the urban system, on economic productivity, on welfare or 
on distribution; and hence even on the competitiveness of our economies.  Fortunately, cities have 
so far appeared to be not just complex but rather robust systems so, while policy has had clearly 
demonstrable but often very unexpected and adverse effects, the world—and the cities in it—carries 
on successfully (Chesire 2006: 1234).
INTRODUCTION
On the Wednesday morning of June 5, 2013 in Center City, Philadelphia, a building 
undergoing demolition collapsed onto an adjacent Salvation Army store, killing six people, 
and injuring another fourteen.  A SEPTA bus stopped at a red light at 22nd and Market 
Streets caught the collapse and ensuing cloud of debris and dust on film (Fleming 2013).  
The video shows several bystanders, some of whom run, and some who seem too 
dumbfounded to move, while traffic continues onward, albeit hesitantly, once the light turns 
green.  The remaining bystanders eventually move to clear out the block, leaving behind a 
thick cloud of dust where two buildings once stood side by side.  
How this tragedy occurred is still not clear, with fingers being pointed at various players 
involved.  The first to be blamed, and the only one under direct criminal charges, including 
involuntary manslaughter, is Sean Benschop, the subcontractor operating the equipment 
when the building collapsed.  It was soon discovered that he had been under the influence 
of drugs, making him seem an even more blameworthy candidate, especially in the eyes of 
the media (Araiza 2013, Loftus 2013).  Did his recklessness kill and injure those 
people?  But then there’s also the contractor who’d hired Benschop, Griffin Campbell, who 
had multiple violations at other work sites, and had recently filed for bankruptcy—is his 
record indicative of a careless, money-hungry work motivation?  Or does blame fall on the 
owner-developer, Richard Basciano, an 87-year-old businessman well-known in the sex 
industry in New York and Philadelphia, and who had planned demolition and redevelopment 
for several surrounding sites—had haste precipitated the collapse (Hurdle 2013)?  And what 
about Licenses & Inspections (L&I), the city department that handles permits for 
demolitions?  Sadly, the inspector in charge of the site, Ronald Wagenhoffer, shot himself in 
an apparent suicide soon after the incident because he had felt responsible for the 
tragedy—but was it his fault?  Mayor Nutter’s chief of staff, Everett Gillison, responded, 
“From what I’ve been able to review, [Wagenhoffer] did his job and he did it the way he was 
supposed to do it...The department did what it was supposed to do under the code that 
existed at the time” (Warner, Findley, and Gambardello 2013, emphasis added).1 
1Benschop and Campbell are both currently facing murder charges; the site is slated to become a memorial 
park.
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Clearly, there’s not one single person to blame for what happened, and as more details 
continue to be revealed, the spotlight has shifted from individuals such as Benschop and 
Wagenhoffer, to the ways in which regulations and procedures are carried out on a 
municipal, state, and even federal level.  Immediately after the collapse, on June 7, Mayor 
Nutter and L&I announced a new set of demolition standards and initiatives, to heighten 
requirements and safety standards, particularly for private demolitions (City of Philadelphia 
2013).  It is unfortunate that these new standards were a reactive response to a tragedy that 
could have been altogether avoided.
What happened here, of course, is not unique to Philadelphia, as demolition and 
construction accidents happen all the time and everywhere, but perhaps what happened 
is indicative of something more insidious that requires deeper exploration.  The former L&I 
Commissioner, Bennett Levin, had some rather harsh and vitriolic words about the 
department at a city council special investigative hearing on August 4, accusing L&I of 
having “moved away from a focus on public safety and was motivated more now by 
economic development” (Araiza 2013).  Especially considering Philadelphia’s status as a 
shrinking (or formerly shrinking) city, this statement merits further dissection.  The 
Philadelphia building collapse thus serves as a jump-off point to better understand the role 
of certain policies within specific social, economic, political, and spatial contexts, and 
particularly within the context of depopulation and economic decline.
The field of planning has traditionally based its framework on the underlying assumption 
that cities grow, and that housing, infrastructure, and services, among others, must be 
planned with that orientation in mind.  In planning, in municipal governments, and in the 
public perception, growth is good, growth is normal.  Growth brings tax dollars to reinvest 
in development, which contributes to making the city an “attractive” place to live, work, and 
visit, thus further stimulating expansion. 
By contrast, shrinking cities have often been labeled as failed or failing cities—if they 
cannot manage to hold onto their populations, then something must be wrong.  In the early 
years that the phenomenon was recognized, city-level and some federal-level governments 
remained largely in denial that shrinkage was a real, ongoing, and worsening trend that 
simply could not be resolved with traditional planning mechanisms geared exclusively 
towards growth, which, in some cases, worsened the situation (Wiechmann 2013).  
Recently, however, a real dialogue and ongoing debates have emerged to address the 
depopulation and decline of cities, with the goal to restructure the normative growth-
centered planning framework.
There exists no consensus on defining “shrinking cities” (or even terminology, for that 
matter), and with so many different geographies, histories, and politics, there can be no 
one-size-fits-all solution or answer.  In most cases, governments are just coming to grips 
with the reality that their city may never again experience the kind of growth it had enjoyed
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in the past.  Leaders and planners thus need to experiment with new and creative ways to 
address present circumstances, in order to better anticipate future needs of the population, 
whomever they may be.  Because there is no cure-all, and because this is a relatively new 
way of thinking, it will surely require experimentation on an individual basis, but at the same 
time, it would be wise to learn from cities that have implemented plans and policies, along 
with their effects.
This research will compare the demolition policies and practices of two shrinking cities 
within one metropolitan statistical area—Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Camden, New 
Jersey.  Both cities have experienced major population losses due to deindustrialization and 
outmigration, and despite their physical proximity, the current states of the two cities are 
vastly different, with Philadelphia having somewhat stabilized and showing recent 
upticks in population, while Camden continues to struggle.  Both cities have an abundance 
of abandoned buildings, where demolition is not uncommon.  This research, therefore, aims 
to understand how each cities’ demolition and vacancy policies have affected the 
current landscape, spatially, socially, economically, and how prominent, if at all, a “smart 
decline”-oriented framework has been in the implementation of such planning tools.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The fall of cities
The constantly changing rhythm of cities is a topic that has already received much 
attention, from scholars to policy makers, and everyone in between—and rightly so,
especially in the face of increasing concentrations of populations in urban centers.  It’s 
almost unimaginable, now when the world seems to have become so city-centric, to think 
back to a time when people were actually deserting them, escaping from the so-called 
“social ills” associated with city living.  But this was one of the realities of the modern US, 
beginning around mid-century, when new and larger single-family homes in outlying areas 
and the opening up of federal highways enticed throngs of people to relocate to the 
suburbs and abandon city centers, taking their tax dollars with them.  Jobs left the cities 
too, as the economy began shifting from heavy manufacturing to light manufacturing- and 
service-oriented economies, leaving behind vacant factories and now-jobless factory 
workers.  As a result, the city became divested of both people and capital, often leaving 
the most immobile low-income populations to fend for themselves, as their neighborhoods 
were increasingly drained of resources and opportunities (Barras 1987: 10).  This, in turn, 
continued to feed into the negative image of inner cities, furthering disinvestment.  These 
are just some of the key points in one instance of depopulation and economic decline 
starting around the mid-twentieth century, representing the manifestation of an amalgam of 
policy decisions that other scholars have already written about extensively (Accordino and
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Johnson 2000, Downs 1997, Metzger 2000), and which will not be discussed too in-depth 
here.  An important point to note, however, is that many key decisions that led to or 
accelerated depopulation were purposeful actions undertaken to produce an intended 
spatial effect: “Disparate patterns...are the legacy of economic racism, decisions on 
industrial locations, and the suburban bias of federal highway and housing programs” 
(Metzger 2000: 7).
Numerous theories as to why cities have declined in the past have been discussed and 
debated at length, borrowing from economics, sociology, and other fields, including, in 
addition to the aforementioned suburbanization/outmigration and deindustrialization: 
neighborhood and regional life-cycles, emphasizing the predeterministic inevitability of 
decline; the spatial effects of creative destruction, also tinged with a quality of inevitable 
obsolescence; and a “natural” cycle of boom and bust flowing with the economic tides, 
just to name a few (Hollander and Németh 2011, Martinez-Fernandez et al. 2012, Pallagast 
2010).  Many theories have been advanced, and rejected, particularly ones that emphasize 
the “natural” and “inevitable” aspects of decline.  Despite the colorful debates, or 
perhaps thanks to them, it has become increasingly clear that no singular theory on its own 
is sufficient in trying to understand why cities have declined.  Hollander and Németh cite 
R. Beauregard’s2 analysis of US cities in a 180-year time span and his “[argument] against 
such wholesale claims, concluding instead that causes of population decline vary from one 
historical period to another” (2011: 352).  This argument will become clearer and more 
understandable below, in the discussion of present-day decline and “shrinking cities.”
Cities rise & fall anew
Cities are in a constant state of flux and flow.  In more recent years, it has become apparent 
that the attraction to cities has increased, the intensity of which seems to be on the rise.  
Cheshire and others have called a part of this phenomenon “resurgent cities” and “urban 
resurgence,” which, generally defined, can be applied where “at least a degree of 
resurgence has occurred and that resurgence is against a context of previous decline” 
(Cheshire 2006: 1232).  Additionally, high-profile and highly-attractive “global cities” are 
situated to attain the best benefits that come with their growth, such as the cream of the 
crop in terms of talent and innovation.  The increasing, yet differential growth of cities is 
facilitated by, and continues to feed into, the competition among cities in a global market-
place; in today’s world, cities not only look to their neighbors in adjacent municipalities, 
but they must also keep an eye on cities on different continents altogether, and compete to 
attract the best of the best—away from others.  This has been aided through deregulation 
and a strong spirit of neoliberalism, allowing for “footloose” firms that can choose to locate 
where they are offered the choicest package of goods and services—the deepest tax cuts, 
the most bonuses, etc (Martinez-Fernandez et al. 2012).
2Beauregard, 2009, “Urban population loss in historical perspective: United States, 1820-2000”
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The flipside to this, of course, is that such non-global cities are losing out.  Where one 
benefits due to locational, social, economic, and political advantages, the other is thusly 
rejected and deserted.  Martinez-Fernandez et al. writes:
 ...globalization is also the cause of the decline of numerous industrial cities that   
 have been unable to find a niche in the international economic competition for 
 capital...the resultant neoliberal project’s physical and economic decline stems from  
 new processes of wealth accumulation by a few through the growing dispossession  
 of the masses (2012: 219, in part citing D. Harvey’s 2005 A brief history of 
 neoliberalism). 
Furthermore, the stakes have become higher today than they ever were before due to the 
rapidity of technological changes, where missing out once could set off a chain of events 
causing a city to continue missing out on future advancements.  In other words, we find 
ourselves in a time where technology waits for no one, and where new innovations are put 
out at an alarmingly fast rate.  Keep up, or miss out forever (or at least for a very long time 
thereafter), is the underlying message here, or borrowing from Manuel Castells (1996), cities 
are either part of the “network society” or they’re not.
Shrinking cities often find themselves in the latter situation, as they are “sidestepped by 
global networks, [they] find themselves metaphorically speaking ‘unplugged’ from interna-
tional engines of growth” (Martinez-Fernandez et al. 2012: 220).  It is in this more modern 
and globalized context that urban decline differentiates itself today from the past, with 
international eyes trained on cities, and where cities are pressured to not only respond to 
local and regional needs, but must also perform favorably enough on a globalized platform.  
As many scholars have pointed out, it is only recently that governments have started to at 
least recognize, and in some cases, acknowledge, accept, and plan for shrinkage.  Still, 
however, there exists no consensus as to its definition or even terminology.  Some scholars 
stick to population counts only (Shetty and Reid 2012: 2033), while others include economic 
and employment changes (Hollander and Németh 2011: 3514, Shetty and Reid 2012: 2035).  
And others have taken counts of abandoned buildings (Hollander and Németh 2011: 3516).  
For R. Beauregard,“shrinking cities” only qualify as such if they have lost populations since 
1980, to account for the fact that suburbanization and urban decline had been such 
prevalent and widespread issues previously (Shetty and Reid 2012: 203).  Downs also 
separates out two time periods of population decline, from 1950-1980 and from 1980 on 
(1997: 362).  Finally, the Shrinking Cities International Research Network (SCIRN), formed
3citing Beauregard, 2007, “Shrinking cities in the United States in historical perspective: A research note”
4citing Rust, 1975, No growth: Impacts on metropolitan areas
5citing Pallagast, 2009, “Shrinking Cities in the United States of America: Three cases, three planning stories” 
6citing Accordino and Johnson 2000, Bowman and Pagano 2004
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expressly to study shrinking cities, has a very specific definition: “a densely populated 
urban area with at least 10,000 residents that has faced population losses in large parts for 
more than two years and is undergoing economic transformations with some symptoms of 
a structural crisis” (Shetty and Reid 2012: 2037).  
These divergences make it very clear that there is no agreement on what constitutes a 
shrinking city, and perhaps, due to such divergent histories and causes, a satisfactory 
agreement may never be reached.  The lack of agreement further implies a multitude of 
responses in terms of how best to deal with shrinkage, and indeed, scholars have been 
careful to not make such blind, wholesale assumptions and solutions.  As a result, 
discussions have primarily centered on theories for shrinkage, and altering the normative 
growth-centered planning framework to be more inclusive of a real and rising global phe-
nomenon, to remove the stigma attached to stagnation, little growth, or decline (Hollander 
and Németh 2011, Martinez-Fernandez et al. 2012, Pallagast 2010, Wiechmann 2008).  In 
other words, how can cities respond more flexibly and creatively, perhaps taking the bold 
step to rethink their own policy framework no longer oriented towards growth? 
Vacancy & abandonment
A common problem that shrinking cities face are the large numbers of vacant and 
abandoned structures left behind, a particularly aggressive problem in the post-industrial 
Northeast (Bowman and Pagano 2004).  With little or dwindling demand, the oversupply 
of housing soon becomes an expensive issue of public safety and neighborhood quality.  
Abandoned buildings tend to have a blighting effect on their surroundings, and maintaining 
them can impose a significant cost on local governments, most of which are already strug-
gling from a low operating budget resulting from a lowered tax base.  Mallach cites three 
examples: Philadelphia spends $26 million a year on vacant properties plus police and fire 
protection, Chicago spent about $875,000 for boarding up buildings in 2010, and Buffalo 
spends $300,000 a year for boarding (2012: 12).  These are considerable expenses, 
especially for struggling cities, but with a diminished power and economic base, they have 
few other options:
 
 Vacant and abandoned properties impose a significant externality (cost) on 
 neighboring property owners by lowering the market value of their properties, which  
 reduces their equity and thus, their wealth, and makes resale of their properties very  
 difficult.  As properties lose market value, their assessed value decreases, which  
 forces central cities to either raise real property tax rates or suffer reduced tax 
 revenues.  Most cities find it difficult to raise tax rates because surrounding suburban  
 communities that compete with cities for residents are able to maintain relatively low  
 rates.  As tax revenues decline, cities find that they have fewer resources to devote
7citing Wiechmann 2007
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 to public improvements and maintenance in neighborhoods and business districts  
 (Accordino and Johnson 2000: 203).    
City governments, therefore, find themselves in tough situations, made even tougher by a 
dilemma of wanting to provide services for their constituents, yet being limited in their 
abilities to do so.  If they raise taxes, would that only drive more people out of the city, 
further reducing the tax base?  Accordino and Johnson also emphasize that abandonment 
is both a symptom and a disease of larger urban problems associated with decline, working 
in a dialectical process, feeding into each other, so that both the symptom and the disease 
must be addressed simultaneously (2000: 203).  For example, boarding up abandoned 
houses may treat the symptom, and perhaps slow down the spread of the disease, but the 
disease has nonetheless been left untreated, and will continue to progress, probably 
worsen.  
Could demolition be the answer to help treat both the symptom and the disease?  Amongst 
scholars, there is a diversity of responses, but most seem to agree that the subject must be 
approached with caution, and it’s not hard to see why.  Demolition has a finality and certain-
ty to it, typically seen as a last resort measure, “where the building is either not capable of 
refurbishment or is in a wrong or decaying environment” (Ashworth 1996).  Moreover, 
demolition is expensive, the costs of which range from city to city, and which depend on the 
types of buildings (detached or row houses, for example), as well as different city and state 
regulations and their associated fees (Mallach 2012).  Are they homes, or are they former 
industrial sites that might require additional environmental testing and cleanup, which add 
to the costs of demolition?  Wassenberg (2011) makes note of the taboo attached to dem-
olition, perhaps because of a last resort quality indicative of failure.  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, is it better to demolish than to preserve, or simply let alone, and does this 
best reflect its intended use?  
Sometimes, a municipality will have to demolish a building when it has become structurally 
unsound, even if a post-demolition plan for the site doesn’t exist—these sites will then be 
left vacant until and if a new use can be found for them.  Accordino and Johnson (2000), 
Bowman and Pagano (2004), Burkholder (2012), and Mallach (2012) expound on the 
potential benefits and uses of vacant lots, particularly their environmental benefits.  They 
could be adopted by surrounding residents and used as community gardens, which studies 
have shown provide important social connections and networking opportunities that are 
crucial in areas of low income and mobility (Feeding Cities 2013).  They could be purchased 
by neighbors, to be used as side yards; vacant lots could be remade into parking lots too.  
Or the city could assemble smaller and irregular parcels and sell them off as a larger and 
more developable tract of land.  The commonality found among the possibilities is that of 
spatially reconfiguring shrinking cities to lower densities.  Barras writes, “...such redevelop-
ment [at lower densities] would help improve the local environment substantially and allow 
the natural locational advantages of these areas to re-emerge...” (1987: 27).  Most seem to
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agree that at the end of the day, a vacant lot is preferable to an abandoned building.     
Mallach argues that demolition “is a necessary step in the process of rebuilding the nation’s 
distressed older cities” (2012: 7), and wonders whether the benefits of costly demolition 
regulations actually outweigh their imposed costs.  One would assume that regulations 
for dangerous projects have been put in place for a reason, but Mallach believes that this 
requires further research.  Importantly, however, Bowman and Pagano (2004) and Mallach 
(2012) present the case that regulations and policies for abandoned lots and buildings are 
too fragmented and require more streamlining; there are too many different bureaus 
involved, which only adds to the confusion and drags out potential projects.  
Finally, Wassenberg (2011), Wiechmann (2008), and even Mallach (2011) himself present 
cautionary tales involving demolition and unintended consequences.  In the US, demolition 
and the probable relocation of residents hearken back to the dark days of urban renewal 
decades earlier.  Within this historical context, demolition and any resulting displacement 
must be done very carefully when people still remember the effects of urban renewal and 
are immediately suspicious about anything that remotely resembles it.  These warnings
bolster the argument for an increased flexibility in planning and a radical reformulation of 
old planning tricks.
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF SHRINKAGE & THE LEGACY OF 
POLICY (IN)ACTION
Philadelphia and Camden are part of the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA), which the Census defines as having an urban core with a population 
of 50,000 or more.  As of July 1, 2012, the MSA had a population of 6,018,800, which 
represents a 0.78% increase from 2010, when the population was 5,972,025.  Table 1 
below provides the population and median household income changes for each city from 
1950 to 2012.  For reference, their respective states (and Camden county, for Camden city; 
Philadelphia county and city are the same) have been included as well.
The table clearly shows the massive population losses that each city has experienced since 
1950.  Philadelphians steadily migrated out of the city until very recently, around 2010, 
when the city began to see a slight uptick in population.  Overall, however, Philadelphia has 
lost about 500,000, or a quarter of its inhabitants over the past fifty decades, and despite 
the recent population increase, median household income remains on a negative trajectory.  
Pennsylvania state’s population has been steadily increasing since 1950, with fairly stable 
median household incomes.  Comparatively, Philadelphians are poorer than Pennsylvanians 
as a whole, and the median household income gap is widening. 
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Camden clearly shows a population decline since 1950—the only exception is 1990, when 
it gained about 2,500 residents, though in 2000 the city lost an additional 5,000 to the 
new residents it had gained the previous decade.  Both Camden county and New Jersey 
have seen steady increases to their populations.  Perhaps the most profound differences 
are seen in median household incomes.  Camden city has barely had a median household 
income over $30,000 within the past thirty years or so, and the 2008 recession seems to 
have completely reversed any economic growth the city was experiencing between 1990 
and 2000 (this is not surprising, as the same could be said about Philadelphia and the other 
geographic units in the table—though the cities have been hit the hardest).  The income 
gaps between Camden city, county, and New Jersey, however, show just how profound 
the differences are, and illustrate the important economic factor of shrinkage in Camden.  
Whereas the income gap between Philadelphians and Pennsylvanians as a whole have 
hovered around $10,000-$15,000, Camden compared to New Jersey has been over 
$40,000 since 1990, and over $30,000 when compared to the county.  
Contextualizing each city within its economic, social, political—and importantly, spatial—
histories will help bring understanding as to why and how these two cities have been turned 
on wildly different paths.  Both profited and fell as the industrial and heavy manufacturing 
age came and went, both have much-desired waterfronts that are potentially ripe for devel-
opment, and the cities are neighbors across the Delaware River, allowing them to access 
and benefit from each other. 
The story of Camden
Ironically, the Benjamin Franklin Bridge that connects Philadelphia and Camden helped
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Change 2000-2010 2012**
Pop. 2,071,605 2,002,512 1,948,609 1,688,210 1,585,577 1,517,550 1,526,006 8,456 0.56% 1,547,607
Income- -- -- - $41,646 $45,554 $42,372 $38,169 -$4,203 -9.92% $37,016
Pop. 10,498,012 11,319,366 11,793,909 11,863,895 11,881,643 12,281,054 12,702,379 421,325 3.43% 12,764,475
Income- -- -- - $53,382 $53,823 $55,271 $53,065 -$2,206 -3.99% $52,267
Pop. 124,555 117,159 102,551 84,910 87,492 79,904 77,344 -2,560 -3.20% 77,250
Income- -- -- - $29,363 $32,191 $32,277 $28,457 -$3,820 -11.84% $26,705
Pop. 300,743 392,035 456,291 471,650 502,824 508,932 513,574 4,642 0.91% 513,660





New Jersey Pop. 4,835,329 6,066,782 7,168,164 7,364,823 7,730,188 8,414,350 8,791,894 377,544 4.49% 8,867,749
Income- -- -- - $62,617 $62,617 $75,998 $73,505 -$2,493 -3.28% $71,637
TABLE 1: Population and median household income* changes between 1950-2012, by 
city, county, and state
*Adjusted to 2012 dollars
** 2012 for reference only; 2010 and 2012 have two overlapping (years 2008-2010) 5-year ACS
Sources: US Census, Social Explorer
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separate the two cities and set them on divergent paths.  Camden had been an industrial 
center in its own right—home to RCA and Campbell’s soup factories, for example, as well
as being a thriving, shipbuilding port city.  Riordan (2002) argues that the decline in Camden 
was really set in motion as early as the 1930s, once the Bridge (and toll plaza) had been 
constructed, which effectively destroyed Camden’s wealthiest neighborhood.  The Bridge 
also allowed Philadelphians and South Jersey residents to completely bypass Camden.  
Whereas Camden, the port city, required all travelers to make a stop there, the Bridge 
simply allowed drivers to pass through it and onto their final destinations.  
Today, the Ben Franklin Bridge and connecting roads still function as means to bypass 
Camden—the city that no one wants to accidentally drive into.  In media and pop culture, 
Camden is often portrayed as a no-man’s land, or as one Rolling Stone article put it, 
“Apocalypse, New Jersey” (Taibbi 2013), for the massive amounts of crimes and drugs that 
seem to always accompany most nightly news headlines involving Camden, and which no 
one can seem to control.  Around 2011, after the city had to lay off more than half of its 
police force, the unofficial city slogan and label was “Run-CMD,” an abbreviation for 
Camden, but also for cash-money-drugs (a play on the rappers Run-DMC) (Taibbi 2013).  
It seemed that Camden residents were proud of their rough image, and the reality is that 
Camden is usually ranked at the top of or among the most dangerous cities in the United 
States.  
An overabundance of vacant and unkempt buildings is often blamed as facilitating criminal 
activity, because they provide free cover from watchful neighbors and the police.  Camden 
has plenty of abandoned buildings, the numbers of which rise as residents continue to flee 
the troubled city.  Table 2 below further illustrates Camden’s troubled economic status, with 
unemployment having risen a staggering 78% and poverty by almost 12% between 2000 
and 2012.  In 2012, the unemployment rate was nearly 24%, and individuals aged 18-64 
below the poverty line (not inclusive of those at or just hovering above the line) represented 
about a third of the entire population.  Putting this into perspective, in 2002, Camden city 
contained less than a fifth of the entire county’s population, but “accounts for three-
quarters of the county’s total welfare caseload” (Riordan 2002).  The unemployment rate is 
especially problematic in a city where youth (under 18 years old) make up a significant bulk 
of the population (about 30% in 2012), and where the so-called “creative class” (here, 
represented in the 25-44 age bracket) has decreased by almost 7% since 2000.  Without 
the prospect of employment, it is not surprising that people would leave the city in droves.
Those who do stay are barely supported by a severely attenuated municipality, which must 
rely on the county, state, and federal governments for additional funds and basic services, 
such as policing.  Those who stay also face increasing numbers of vacant and abandoned 
properties (a 55% increase in housing units from 2000-2012).  Despite the increasing 
vacancy, renters have to pay higher rents (22%) even though median household incomes 




2000 79,904  1,517,550
2012 77,606  1,525,811
Change
 -2,298  8,261
-2.88% 0.54%
Ages 0-17
2000  27,674 34.63%  383,469 25.27%
2012  24,410 31.45%  345,826 22.67%
Change
 -3,264  -37,643
-11.79% -9.82%
Ages 25-44: “creative class”
2000  23,537 29.46%  444,774 29.46%
2012  21,942 28.27%  437,686 28.27%
Change  (1,595)  (7,088)-6.78% -1.59%
Ages 18-64: general workforce
2000  46,140 57.74%  920,359 60.65%
2012  46,140 60.82%  993,768 65.13%
 1,063  73,409
2.30% 7.98%
Ages 65+
6,090 7.62%  213,722 14.08%
5,993 7.72%  186,217 12.20%
 (97)  (27,505)
-1.59% -12.87%
White  
 5,985 7.49%  645,973 42.57%
 3,719 4.79%  561,646 36.81%
 (2,266)  (84,327)
-37.86% -13.05%
Black
 39,360 49.26%  644,409 42.46%
 33,310 42.92%  644,938 42.27%
 (6,050)  529
-15.37% 0.08%
Latino
 30,869 38.63%  128,300 8.45%
 37,338 48.11%  188,061 12.33%

















 % of 
tot. pop. 
Camden Philadelphia
Education: < high school (of tot. pop. age 25+)
2000  20,929   278,090 
2012  15,477   192,758 
Change
  -5,452   -85,332
-26.05% -30.69%
Education: BA Degree+ 
2000   2,290 5.30%   172,641 17.58%
2012  3,290 7.61%   227,799 23.20%
Change
  1,000   55,158 
43.67% 31.95%
Unemployed (of civilian labor force)
2000   4,331 15.86%   71,582 10.90%
2012   7,693 23.90%  104,102 14.45%
Change  3,362  32,520 77.63% 45.43%
Median Household Income (2012 $)
2000   $32,277 
48.96%
  $42,372 
28.78%
2012  $26,705 
35.80%
  $37,016 
19.63%
  -$5,572  -$5,356
-17.26% -12.64%
Below Poverty (of tot. pop. age 18-64)
 13,080 30.65%   183,032 20.61%
 14,638 32.71%   234,630 24.38%
  1,558  51,598 
11.91% 28.19%
Vacant Units (of tot. housing units) 
  4,957 7.49%   71,887 10.86%
  7,693 4.79%   88,735 13.26%
  2,736   16,848 
55.19% 23.44%
Owner-Occupied (of tot. occupied)
 11,141 46.08%   349,633 59.25%
  9,877 39.94%   314,076 54.10%
  -1,264   -35,557
-11.35% -10.17%
Renter-Occupied
  13,036 38.63%   240,438 40.75%
  14,854 48.11%   266,433 45.90%















TABLE 2: Population and housing characteristics for Camden and Philadelphia, 2000 and 2012
All dollar figures adjusted to 2012 dollars.
Sources: US Census, Social Explorer 11
mass demolitions, but thus far, it does not appear that demolition efforts have produced the 
intended effects.  One consistent thread that does appear throughout various plans is the 
ultimate goal of attracting new residents and spurring new development—in other words, 
growth.  Despite the massive population losses and worsening economic conditions, 
Camden’s policies, even concerning demolition, have largely been growth-oriented.     
Riordan (2002) writes about the 1962 master plan, which had sought to demolish and 
redevelop the entire downtown, and which was basically a failure because it looked com-
pletely inward, rather than considering what else was happening within the region.  In the 
1980s, the city realized the randomness of the demolitions they had been undertaking, 
which had made the plots harder to redevelop.  The hope of this new program was that a 
comprehensive demolition plan would spark a renewed Camden.  City officials saw vacant 
buildings as “one of the primary barriers to Camden’s renaissance,” yet how could the 
city enact a comprehensive plan when the “main priority is eliminating the hazards,” while 
faced with the reality of diminishing funds and increasing vacancies (Gonzalez 1987)?  The 
next master plan came in 2002 with FutureCamden, which proclaimed the goal of attract-
ing 20,000 new residents, to bring up the entire city population to 100,000 (Gillette 2002: 
267, Riordan 2002).  The plan for the “‘improvement of the lives of the city’s...neediest 
residents’” (Riordan 2002) called for $17 million in the demolition of abandoned buildings 
(Gillette 2002: 267).  The plan, however, seemed to have some contradictory points: it 
called for 6,700 new or rehabilitated units; five new industrial parks, even though the goal 
of redevelopment supposedly was not to “restore the city’s industrial might”; and creating 
a big box retail district, despite proximity to the suburban mall in neighboring Cherry Hill 
and acknowledgement that good (i.e. living wage), steady jobs were difficult to find (Riordan 
2002).  Apparently, the plan did not have utopian plans, but it was not entirely clear how the 
approaches set forth would attract 20,000 new residents, particularly when the plan did not 
seem to address the governance and social and economic realities felt by current city 
residents.  A positive aspect of the plan was that it highlighted the important role of 
grassroots and nonprofit organizations, which have had perhaps the most uplifting effects 
on the city.  Though acknowledged, the plan fell short of fully capitalizing on and integrating
Camden Philadelphia
Median Value (of owner-occupied, 2012 $)
2000  $54,399     $81,331 
2012   $90,000     $142,300 
Change
   $35,601    $60,969 
65.44% 74.96%
Median Gross Rent (2012 $)
2000    $696 5.30%    $759  17.58%
2012   $851 7.61%    $872  23.20%
Change




unemployed: “Camden’s real estate market 
has fallen so low that only mass demolition can 
hope to revive it.  But Camden suffers from the 
classic plight of the prisoner’s dilemma.  So 
many Camdenites have grown dependent on 
its cheap, substandard housing that the city 
is increasingly made up of very poor people...
[which] cannot afford to provide basic city ser-
vices” (Weyrich 2006).
This prisoner’s dilemma does not mean that 
the city has not tried to move forward with
(TABLE 2 cont’d)
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such organizations.  The overall disjuncture of the 2002 plan is possibly an indication of the 
fragmentation among governing officials.  As Rutgers-Camden professor, Howard Gillette 
writes, “So hardened has the establishment’s view become of Camden’s presumed incom-
petence that city officials were given little chance to influence substantially any part of the 
process.  The mayor finally endorsed the bill because she had no alternative” (2002: 269).
The federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 (NSP2) was the next big plan for Cam-
den set forth in 2010.  Though much hope had been placed in the grant funding, by 2013, 
only a third of the slated 300 properties had been demolished, built, or rehabilitated (Vargas 
2013).  Again, officials thought that the $26 million would have attracted new residents; it 
hasn’t.  Instead, the success of these efforts has been that current residents are now able 
to benefit from new housing options and a streamlined financing process (Vargas 2013).  
As to whether the demolition process has become much less random than before and 
happens under a comprehensive plan, it is not clear and requires further investigation.  With 
limited funds, however, it makes sense that any planning and demolition strategy is likely 
to be sidestepped when the city is faced with increasing numbers of dilapidated and immi-
nently dangerous buildings.  Indeed, two city officials involved in public demolitions both 
agreed that they tended to respond to need rather than acting on a comprehensive plan.  
The story of Philadelphia
Philadelphia has long suffered from population losses since its peak in 1950, but recently 
began to see some modest increases, primarily in areas around the Center City District.  As 
can be seen in the preceding table, Philadelphia experienced an increase in population for 
the first time in five decades, by about half a percentage point, or a little more than 8,000 
new residents.  The age breakdown shows some interesting and important patterns that 
may be indicative of future growth or decline.  In recent reports and news coverage about 
Philadelphia’s turn of events, authors cite the fact that more and more young people have 
been remaining in the city after graduating from one of the many Philadelphia area univer-
sities.  The Census data (not included in above table) support this: the population between 
the ages of 18-24 has increased by nearly 18% between 2000 and 2012.  At the same time, 
the age bracket of 25-44 has decreased by about 1.5%.  Assuming that this bracket makes 
up the bulk of new families with young children, this trend is likely due to the struggling 
public school system and fears of crime in Philadelphia—the 10% decrease in youth under 
18 also supports this suggestion.  The overall workforce, however, defined as ages 18-64, 
has increased by almost 8%, and retirees (ages 65 and older) have decreased significantly, 
by over 12%.  In sum, what these data show is that in recent years, Philadelphia has 
increased its overall workforce and decreased its non-workforce (children and retirees), 
which could favorably position the city to enjoy increased economic benefits in the future.  
The mayor’s office is aware of this potential, but also its tenuousness.  The mayor believes 
that holding onto new and younger, working-aged residents (such as recent college
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graduates) in the city is key to its long-term economic health—this is supported by a recent 
competition announcement for innovative plans to attract and retain millennials.   
In addition, vacancies and abandonment remain another tough issue for the city to deal 
with, where vacant housing units rose by 23% from 2000 to 2012.  In 2000, Philadelphia 
had the most abandoned buildings per capita in the entire country, at a rate of 36.5 
buildings for every 1,000 residents (McGovern 2006: 5368).  The impacts of vacancy and 
abandonment have been particularly severe in Philadelphia, spurring on a slew of research 
and studies on the massive losses of tax revenue due to not only tax delinquency, but also 
a too-lax enforcement and collection policy (Kerkstra 2013a, 2013b).  Kerkstra (2013a) 
writes that the vast majority (or about 70%) of the buildings that the Department of Licenses 
and Inspections (L&I) demolished from 2011 to 2012 were tax-delinquent.  More profound 
still is that each L&I demolition has cost the taxpayer an average of $13,000 per job, which 
amounted to a total of $9.5 million of taxpayers’ money.  Importantly, the average time that 
a building remains tax delinquent is about 15 years, which, when taken together with all the 
other tax delinquent properties throughout the city, adds up to an enormous loss for the 
municipality and a disservice to its taxpaying residents.  
Recently, Mayor Nutter committed to hammering down on tax delinquency, using firmer 
measures and more sheriff’s sales to divest negligent owners of their properties, or to scare 
them into paying their back taxes.  The latest reports show only very minor progress so far, 
and many remain dubious as to whether the city will be able to enforce its harder stance to 
fulfill its goals.  L&I has also been under intense criticism as well, for failing to act on 
imminently dangerous buildings, which seem to be collapsing all over the city in record 
numbers as they continue to deteriorate.  Nutter has therefore approved a budget increase 
for the department, in order to add more inspectors to the payroll and to allow for much-
need technological upgrades.
Philadelphia has an uphill battle if it wants to stabilize not only its population count, but also 
its economic vitality.  Does the recent population increase truly reflect a trend reversal or 
stabilization, or is it just a random blip?  Recall that some scholars define “shrinking cities” 
as those experiencing economic losses.  By that definition alone, it is probably too soon to 
celebrate any sort of victory, because economically, Philadelphia is still struggling.  Though 
not as severe as Camden, the data from 2000 and 2012 from the preceding table clearly 
show that Philadelphia has seen increased unemployment by 45%, with a citywide 
unemployment rate of 14% in 2012; decreased median household income by 13%; and an 
almost 30% increase in individuals 18-64 years old who are below the poverty line (24% 
were below the line in 2012).  Philadelphia has been making bold efforts to stabilize its 
population and economy, but more work will be required if it wants to maintain the small 
signs of success it has seen within the past couple of years.
8citing Bowman and Pagano 2000
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As another point of departure from Camden, Philadelphia seems to have wholeheartedly 
acknowledged, accepted, and planned with a shrinking population and decreasing 
economic prosperity in mind, though this does not necessarily mean it has had greater 
success.  In 2001, then-mayor John Street announced his bold and much-praised Neigh-
borhood Transformation Initiative (NTI) to fight the blight issue.  In its initial studies, NTI had 
counted 26,000 abandoned buildings and 31,000 vacant lots.  The plan was to have more 
than half of the proposed general obligation bonds, raising $250 million, go towards 14,000 
demolitions.  Through NTI, the mayor attempted to show that he prioritized neighborhood 
revitalization over downtown development, was committed to locally-generated revenue 
for funding, emphasized the planning process over politics, and promised to streamline the 
fragmented redevelopment process (McGovern 2006: 529-30).  The hope was that a struc-
tured and targeted demolition strategy would allow for land assembly, for redevelopment by 
nonprofits and the private sector.  
Fears of urban renewal stunted the full, potential force of NTI, however, along with other 
unanticipated setbacks (McGovern 2006).  Justifiably, residents in lower-income neighbor-
hoods were skeptical of a plan that proposed mass demolitions in struggling areas, for the 
sake of “revitalization.”  NTI had to be renegotiated and softened to ameliorate fears.  As a 
result, in 2003, the first year of NTI, only 350 out of the proposed 2,000 residential demoli-
tions occurred (McGovern 2006: 543).  Though bold and unique as a plan, the implemen-
tation failed overall; demolitions did not reach anywhere near 14,000 within the five-year 
timeframe, totaling about 5,000 instead.  Rather than being assembled for redevelopment, 
many of the newly-vacant lots became community gardens, playgrounds, or green lots 
(McGovern 2006: 556)—which is not necessarily a bad thing.  Retrospective analyses have 
linked the mere presence of NTI in a neighborhood (along with increased downtown 
development) with increased property values, which made takings of some targeted 
property too expensive, and therefore impossible (McGovern 2006: 558).  By not fully 
anticipating the full spectrum of possibilities, it seems that NTI was doomed from the 
beginning.  (The mayor himself was also caught up in scandal; Street was later investigated 
for non NTI-related corruption, but has never been charged.)
The election of the current progressive mayor, Michael Nutter, in 2007, was a possible sign 
of regime change in Philadelphia, argues McGovern (2008).  Mayor Nutter, both as former 
city council member and current mayor, has been a so-called advocate of reforming city 
politics and its “pay-to-play” system, proclaiming that “‘planning will be valued.  It will be 
utilized’” through the establishment of a Zoning Reform Commission, for example, and by 
fully employing the City Planning Commission (McGovern 2008: 687).  There is no space to 
discuss it in-depth in this paper, but the Philadelphia 2035 plan seems to be making good 
on Nutter’s promise of zoning reform, which includes a comprehensive citywide plan, as 
well as individual plans for each district.  Reactions to the plan and new zoning code and 
maps have been mostly positive so far.  An updated zoning code that focuses on 
increasing development, however, is sure to have impacts on the rate and scale of
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demolitions throughout the city.  Whether this had been carefully studied and addressed 
remains to be seen, though one cannot help but wonder if the new code has played a part 
in increasing the frequency of recent building collapses, either by a swell of permits that 
have been unmanageable for the current number of L&I inspectors, by hasty demolition 
work to capitalize on a time of high demand, or both.
METHODOLOGY 
There are two components to the research design: one, where does demolition occur—
within what social, economic, and spatial contexts; and two, to what extent do demolitions 
happen there?  The aim of answering these two questions is central to understanding how 
actual demolition work and policy discourse stack up against each other.  
Limitations & data manipulation
Only one time period will be analyzed.  The 2008-2012 time period corresponds to the 2012 
5-Year American Community Survey (ACS), which contains all the demographic and 
housing data.  Because a 5-year survey is needed for data going down to the tract and 
block-group level (further details below), 1-year and 3-year surveys were not used.  Addi-
tionally, it is not possible to compare 2011 and 2012 5-year surveys, since they share 
overlapping years (2008-2011).
The city demolition data are also limited by size and scope.  The Philadelphia data was 
obtained by submitting a Right-to-Know request with the Department of Licenses and 
Inspections (L&I), which handles all the permitting for private demolitions and contracting 
for public demolitions.  I was informed that 2008 was the earliest retrievable dataset, so I 
was given data from 2008 to 20139.   Of this dataset, however, about 350 of the permits had 
no dates, and therefore had to be excluded.  It is also important to note that the information 
I was given were permits for demolition, and did not represent actual work.  For the purpos-
es of this research, and since permits were, after all, granted, the data will be assumed as 
completed demolition work.  In addition, “demolition” could refer to complete or partial
9I had also obtained data from 2001-2013 from the Planning department, but it was completely unusable.  
When pressed for further details about the source, and whether the dataset represented public, private, or 
both types of demolition, I was told to contact L&I, because apparently, that was the original source.  When 
I asked L&I about this, I was told they didn’t understand my question and that they didn’t “provide that type 
of service.”  The only conclusion that I can draw from this, is that clearly, older datasets exist, but have been 
mismanaged (or are being purposefully withheld).they didn’t “provide that type of service.”  The only conclu-
sion that I can draw from this, is that clearly, older datasets exist, but have been mismanaged (or are being 
purposefully withheld).
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building removal, as well as interior-only demolitions.  From 2008-2012, Philadelphia saw 
2,201 public demolitions and 1,137 private demolitions (totaling 3,338).  All the data were 
fully digitized, had exact dates of permits for the most part, and contained street-level 
addresses and some notes.
The Camden data was obtained in person, from the Department of Public Works.  I was 
given paper copies of monthly public demolitions from 1990 to 2013, which contain street-
level addresses and a few notes.  In Camden’s case, these addresses did represent 
completed work, though similar to Philadelphia, the data could refer to partial demolitions 
and debris removal.  From 2008-2012, Camden saw a total of 410 public demolitions; 
unfortunately, private demolitions could not be obtained for this study.  All Camden data 
had to be digitized.  
Crime data would have been ideal to include in this research, but a usable format could 
not be obtained.  Property values and/or tax assessments could have also been very infor-
mative, but could not be found in a usable format (unless I wanted to pay for the data, as 
in the case of Philadelphia).  Instead, I used median house values of owner-occupied units 
and median gross rents of renter-occupied units, as measured in the American Community 
Survey, as a proxy for property values.  Of course, these are not completely satisfactory 
because they only related to housing units, and probably do not fully capture values, espe-
cially in more commercial, industrial, and other areas.  
The “where”: GIS analysis
The first question addresses the social, economic, and spatial context of demolition: where 
are the highest concentrations of demolition, what are the socio-economic characteristics 
(income and poverty, unemployment, race, educational attainment, English-speaking abili-
ty), and what are the housing characteristics (occupancy, age of structures, dwelling types)? 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is a powerful tool that allows for spatially-defined 
data to be mapped, layered, and analyzed.  Among the suite of Esri’s ArcMap toolset, the 
Getis-Ord GI* (Hotspot analysis) tool is particularly useful for measuring the statistical sig-
nificance of relationships among local phenomena.  It takes choropleth, or density maps, 
to the next level, by identifying clusters that share similarly high features (“hotspots) or 
similarly low features (“coldspots”), and also identifying how far they are from the mean of 
a normally-distributed curve.  For example, 2.58 standard deviations away from the mean, 
or a z-score greater than 2.58 or less than -2.58, visualize the hottest and coldest spots, 
respectively (see image below).  In sum, the presence of hotspots and coldspots show that 
statistically-significant patterns probably do exist, and that the corresponding null hypothe-
sis (no pattern) may be rejected.
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Hotspot analysis diagram: hotspots, coldspots, and z-scores
Source: ESRI
Analyzing hotspots will take place at the Census block group level10; these simple polygons 
are then joined with Census data, and become the primary unit of analysis for answering 
the question of “where.” Whenever possible, Census data were normalized in advance (to 
percentages, rather than using raw figures, which could be misleading).  The demolition 
addresses had to be geocoded to each city’s streets shapefile, creating points (x,y) within 
the maps; I also compiled a table of major institutions for each city (mainly universities, hos-
pitals, and primary cultural institutions), and geocoded those addresses as well.  In addi-
tion, I created a half-mile buffer around each institution to approximate its area of influence.  
A half-mile seemed like a reasonable, yet still modest estimate, though in some cases, this 
could very well be an over- or under-estimation, as in the cases of museums (over-
estimation) and large universities with multiple campuses or surrounding student 
dormitories (under-estimation).  
Initially, I had isolated Camden city from the county for the analyses, but later had to 
include the county.  As will be discussed in the results section, the small size, as well as the 
dispersal of similar characteristics throughout the city, caused the hotspot results to appear 
insignificant.  In order to truly capture Camden city’s situation, I added the rest of the 
county back in, to provide a more robust comparison and results. 
10I had initially started at the tract-level, but because Camden has fewer than 30 tracts, or a sample size under 
30 (n < 30), block groups were used instead to increase the sample size.  Philadelphia did not have this issue, 
but I used block groups here too, for the sake of continuity.
18
The goal of the GIS analysis is to detect any spatial arrangements of the above-mentioned 
variables, and see where they do or don’t overlap, and how intensely.  Is there a distinct or 
distinguishable pattern that makes sense within the context of each city?  Scholars have 
noted that demolition should be prioritized in areas of abandonment where there is potential 
for economic development—but how feasible is this if a struggling city with limited funds 
must prioritize imminently dangerous structures at the cost of carrying out a comprehensive 
demolition plan?  
The “to what extent”: regression analysis
Knowing where demolitions occur, the second question asks why and to what extent they 
happen there.  Assuming that private demolitions will occur where there is high develop-
ment potential, I decided to focus solely on public demolitions here.  The analysis requires 
a regression to measure the relationships, strengths, and statistical significance of indepen-
dent variables in predicting demolitions (dependent variable).  
Specifically, the equation could contain:
 Ydemolition   =   a + bxvacancies + bxunit age + bxunit type + bxowner/renter + bxhouse values + bxrent + 
       bxmedian household income + bxpoverty + bxunemployment + bxeducation + bxrace + bxage +  
       bxEnglish-speaking ability + bxinstitutional buffer
Overall Hypothesis: Housing characteristics, house values and rents, socio-economic 
characteristics of the residents, and proximity to major institutions will have an effect on 
demolitions.
Null Hypothesis: Housing characteristics, house values and rents, socio-economic 
characteristics of the residents, and proximity to major institutions have no effect on 
demolitions.
The regression analysis required quite a bit of data manipulation using GIS, to account 
for the limitations.  As discussed in the preceding section, analysis was performed on the 
block groups.  For regression, this required collapsing and summing all demolition points to 
their respective block groups.  In addition, block groups were overlaid with the institutional 
buffers, and where there were overlaps (where a block group intersected any buffer), these 
were also collapsed and summed to each polygon.  Therefore, each block group, along 
with its relevant Census data, included sums of public demolitions (and private demolitions 
for Philadelphia, for comparison) and sums of institutional buffers, or influence.
The model proved to be problematic, even after removing variables, running several differ-
ent types of regressions (nonlinear, logistic, weighted), and re-manipulating the data.  The 
single biggest issue with all models was heteroscedasticity, which means that the variability
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of the variables (demographic data, housing data, and institutional buffers) is inconsistent 
across what they are trying to predict (demolitions).  Despite this, I have decided to include 
the results, with caution.  This will be discussed further in the following sections, and meth-
ods to resolve this issue can be found in the appendix.   
Stata 12.1 and GeoDa were used for the regression analyses.
ANALYSIS RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The “where”: GIS analysis
Mapping the data points shows the spatial patterns of demolitions, and more importantly, 
how they are positioned amongst other demographic and housing characteristics of the 
cities.  Additionally, analyzing Philadelphia and Camden simultaneously begins to hint at 
some important differences in how each city approaches demolition.
MAP 1 on the following page shows five years of demolition in each city, from 2008-2012, 
with green dots representing public demolitions, and purple dots representing private.  Al-
ready, a picture emerges; in Philadelphia, public and private demolitions generally do not 
focus on the same geographic areas.  Though there is some intense clustering of 
private demolitions around the Center City area (which looks bisected due to the Vine Street 
Expressway), the overall pattern is more variegated and spread throughout portions of 
the entire city.  Comparatively, public demolitions in Philadelphia are much more intensely 
clustered, showing three, and possibly four, distinct groupings.  The empty patch between 
clusters 1 and 3 is a park.
Camden also has some distinct clusters (or possibly one cluster separated by the river, 
parks, and cemetery), but what’s even more noticeable is the density of demolitions 
compared to Philadelphia.  With a land area of 8.92 square miles, Camden’s 410 public 
demolitions between 2008-2012 translated to 45.96 demolitions per square mile.  With a 
land area of 134.10 square miles, Philadelphia’s 2,201 public demolitions came to 16.41 per 
square mile, and 1,137 private demolitions to 8.48 per square mile; the combined total of 
3,338 translated to 24.89 demolitions per square mile, which shows that overall density is 
still significantly lower in Philadelphia than in Camden11.  As a ratio of demolitions to peo-
ple12, Camden had 0.0052 public demolitions per person, while Philadelphia had 0.0014 
public demolitions and 0.0007 private demolitions per person (0.0022 total demolitions per
11This still holds even when the 350 undated demolitions are added to the total count: 3,688 demolitions is 
equal to 27.50 per square mile.
12Using the 2012 population count and combining demolitions for all five years from 2008-2012.
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MAP 1: Orientation. Public and private demolitions in Philadelphia and Camden, 
2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, 
US Census
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person) within the same five-year timeframe.
An easy first assumption to make about demolitions in shrinking cities might be that 
demolitions tend to be more concentrated in less population-dense areas, assuming that 
these areas would have more vacancies and derelict structures.  The following density map 
shows that this is not the case, however:







Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), 







This simple choropleth map clearly shows that, for either city, demolitions tended to be 
more frequent where there were more residents, possibly hinting that more demolitions are 
targeted for where there is greater need (for the residents living in that neighborhood) or a 
greater possibility of redevelopment post-demolition (assuming that block groups with more 











MAP 3A: Median household income +
public demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 3B: Median household income +
private demolitions, 2008-2012
Maps 3a and 3b above show median household income, and this is where the differences 
between private (purple dots) and public (green dots) demolitions really become increas-
ingly apparent.  The bulk of private clustering takes place in and around Center City, which 
is a high income hotspot, while adjacent and smaller clusterings in income cold spots, or 
low-income areas, are likely due to large and expanding universities (the University of Penn-
sylvania and Drexel University to the left, and Temple University to the north) being located 
in or directly adjacent to poorer neighborhoods.    
In stark contrast, public demolitions have taken place almost exclusively within low-income 
areas.  The main cluster is in North Philadelphia, which has the largest and most intense 
median income coldspot.  Anyone who has ever driven around here probably would not be 
surprised by this, as parcels of land with a single rowhouse or fenced off patches of grass 
where buildings once stood are dotted throughout the neighborhoods.  (The blanks in the 
map represent no data.)
The entire city of Camden is an income coldspot, when compared to Camden county, and 
the vast majority of public demolitions have taken place in areas of most intense clustering.
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, 
US Census, Social Explorer
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As expected, poverty, unemployment, and educational attainment (bachelor’s degree or 
higher) follow similar patterns:
MAP 4B: Families in poverty + private 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 4A: Families in poverty + public 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 5A: Unemployment + public 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 5B: Unemployment + private 
demolitions, 2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, 
US Census, Social Explorer
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MAP 6A: Bachelor’s degree or higher + 
public demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 6B: Bachelor’s degree or higher + 
private demolitions, 2008-2012
Again, the entire city of Camden consistently turns out to be an entire hotspot or coldspot.  
In terms of educational attainment, the presence of two private universities and a 
community college seems to have no positive effect on their surroundings.
Unemployment in Philadelphia showed 
some interesting results, likely because 
of how the American Community Survey 
measures this variable, which counts only 
those currently in the (civilian) work force 
for the population 16 years old and older.  
Coldspots for employment are possibly 
more telling.
The three dominant race groups for either 
city are white, black, and Latino.  The 
table in the background section showed 
that between 2000 and 2012, Latinos 
have become the dominant race group
MAP 5C: Employment + all 
demolitions, 2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), 
Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, 
NJDEP GIS, US Census, Social Explorer
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in Camden, whereas blacks had made up half the population in 2000.  In Philadelphia, the 
Latino population surged by 45% between these years, though blacks and whites are still 
split somewhat equally (blacks dominating slightly by 2012).  In both cities, the white popu-
lation decreased between 2000 and 2012. 
MAP 7A: White + all demolitions, 
2008-2012
MAP 7B: Black + all demolitions, 
2008-2012
MAP 7C: Latino + all demolitions, 
2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), 
Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, 
NJDEP GIS, US Census, Social Explorer
These maps, when compared with the 
economic and education maps, show the 
intersection of race and class.  In the case 
of Philadelphia, the white and black divide 
is stark, where hotspots of white popula-
tions and hotspots of black populations are 
exclusive of the other.  White hotspots tend 
to have wealthier and more educated resi-
dents, and see a greater number of private 
demolitions, while black hotspots tend to be 
the opposite, and see more public demoli-
tions.  Interestingly, Latinos in Philadelphia 
have concentrated in neither black nor white 
areas, but in a patch in between—which has 
had an overwhelmingly greater number of 
public over private demolitions.
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For Camden, a black and Latino divide also exists, but is not as stark, though the black 
hotspot ends abruptly about two thirds of the way up from South Camden.  Latinos are 
concentrated in North Camden and further north past the city limits.  
Analyses by age groups and English-speaking abilities can be found in the appendix.
Housing characteristics:
MAP 8A: Owner-occupied units + 
public demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 8B: Owner-occupied units + 
private demolitions, 2008-2012
For either city, demolitions from 2008-2012 typically avoided areas with high rates of 
owner-occupancy, which makes intuitive sense.  After the urban renewal era, private prop-
erty takings are done much more cautiously.  In Philadelphia, public demolitions stayed in 
somewhat neutral territory, but private demolitions have gathered around and in the 
owner-occupancy coldspots, or renter-occupied hotspots (not shown, see appendix).  
Camden city, compared to the county, contains vastly greater numbers of renter-occupied 
units.
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer
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MAP 9A: Vacant + public demolitions, 
2008-2012
MAP 9B: Vacant + private demolitions, 
2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer
The vacancy hotspots begin to reveal more concrete patterns for public demolitions.  Aside 
from Fairmount Park (the triangular polygon towards the west), public demolitions in Phil-
adelphia have been concentrated in and around the most intense vacancy hotspots.  The 
little hotspot patch just south of Center City is particularly telling, because it shows an 
isolated site for an intense concentration of public demolitions.  
Surprisingly, Camden’s vacancy hotspot, as compared to the rest of the county, takes up 
a smaller portion of the city than anticipated, whereas other hotspots have taken up much 
larger portions or the entire city altogether.  Public demolitions are nearly exclusive to the 
hottest of the vacancy hotspots, which suggests that this may be a strategy in carrying out 
demolition work.  It is tempting to say that Philadelphia might follow this strategy also, but 
the map clearly shows that a good portion of public demolitions have happened in neutral 
areas, and the dispersal of these points does not appear random enough.  The vacancy 
strategy may be but part of a strategy.
Clearly, private demolitions are not exclusively concentrated in areas of high vacancy, as 
much as public demolitions are.  Housing vacancy, with all else being equal, does not
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appear to have such a strong pull for private demolitions, and do not necessarily equate to 
opportunities for development.  This makes sense, especially within the context of Phila-
delphia, which not only has high vacancy rates, but also high rates of tax delinquency.  The 
majority of tax delinquent properties in Philadelphia are owned by investors and landlords 
(and many of whom are not residents of the city), and these often vacant and/or derelict 
properties have majorly cost the city of Philadelphia much-needed tax revenue, while 
further driving down values of neighboring properties, which discourages those owners 
from maintaining their properties or paying taxes—and the cycle continues.  One study has 
found, “Fewer than five [delinquent parcels within 500 feet of the home], and the delinquen-
cies do only negligible damage to home values.  Five or more, however, and delinquency 
begins to drain values quickly” (Kerkstra 2013a).  As previously mentioned, about 70% of 
the buildings that L&I demolished between 2011 and 2012 were tax delinquent, and 
probably vacant.  In a shrinking or struggling city especially, a high vacancy rate may act as 
red flags for private developers.
I then wanted to see what kinds of housing structures undergo more demolition.  I started 
by looking at single-family homes (1 unit detached), and then looked to the other extreme of 
50 units or more.  Results did not reveal much:
MAP 10A: 1-unit detached + public 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 10B: 1-unit detached + private 
demolitions, 2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer
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The maps show that in Philadelphia, no one really goes after single-family homes, which 
tend to be located near city borders, next to wealthier suburbs.  Camden city, compared to 
the rest of the county, has very few single-family homes, but reveals no further information. 
Another important consideration is the age of structures.  For the analysis, they were divid-
ed between newer (built since 1980) and older (built in 1979 or earlier) housing units.  Maps 
for newer units are below:
MAP 11B: newer units + private 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 11A: newer units + public 
demolitions, 2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer
It is somewhat surprising that in Philadelphia, private demolitions overlap in areas that have 
much newer housing stock than the rest of the city.  At the same time, this seems reason-
able because areas around Center City have already had the highest concentrations of 
private development.  On its own, the age of structures, when normalized for the entire 
block group, does not seem to have a significant bearing on where demolition occurs, for 
both private and public work.  Camden has neither many old or new housing hotspots.  
Finally, it is necessary to look at median house values (for owner-occupied) and median 
rents (for renter-occupied), which stand in as a proxy for property values:
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MAP 12A: Median home value + public 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 12B: Median home value + private 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 13A: Median rent + public 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 13B: Median rent + private 
demolitions, 2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer
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This set of maps is similar to the vacancy maps.  In Philadelphia, public demolitions are 
concentrated in areas of both low median house values and low rents, while private demo-
litions are concentrated in areas of high median house values and higher rents.  In Camden, 
more public demolitions seem to overlap with areas of the lowest median house values, but 
are fairly mixed throughout neutral and somewhat low median rents.  
Other analysis: 
I wanted to see the possibility of institutions having a bearing on demolitions (maps 14a and 
14b).  If taken at face value, it would appear that city officials in Philadelphia have generally 
avoided demolitions near major institutions, while private demolitions either had little regard 
for them, or tended to crowd around them, to maximize development potential.  Camden’s 
public demolitions also seem more concentrated between the two sets of institutional 
buffers.  These maps allow for some speculation, but are ultimately too ambiguous on their 
own to draw any conclusions.  For instance, the locations of the major institutions may
 simply be where there are not as many surrounding structures, as in the case of 
Philadelphia’s Museum of Art.    
MAP 14A: Institutional buffers + public 
demolitions, 2008-2012
MAP 14B: Institutional buffers + private 
demolitions, 2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer, Google Maps
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Finally, I brought together some of the hotspots that seemed to have the most obvious 
spatial relationships to as many of the public demolition points as possible in Philadelphia.  
Because Camden was a little too consistent in its demographic and housing hotspots, the 
same type of treatment would not have produced anything significant.
Because of how much vacancy seemed to have a bearing on public demolitions, I simply 
selected data points that overlapped with vacancy hotspots.  Between 2008 and 2012, 
there were a total of 1,317 public demolitions in high vacancy areas, or 60% of all 2,201 
public demolitions.  
Then, I overlaid the demographic hotspots that appeared to share the greatest spatial 
relationships to the demolition points, and selected only those block groups that over-
lapped.
When areas of high poverty, concentrations of incomes under $10,000, and low educa-
tional attainment were combined, this new polygon overlapped with 1,079 points, or 49% 
of all public demolitions (map 15a).
Next, the same was done for housing hotspots (map 15b).
MAP 15A: Demographic overlays,
2008-2012
MAP 15B: Housing overlays,
2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer
33
Overlapping concentrations of low median house values, low median rents, and high 
vacancy produced the map to the right.  This new polygon overlapped with 1,140 points, or 
51.2% of all public demolitions, which is slightly higher than demolitions in relation to 
demographic data. 
This might show that housing characteristics have a greater bearing on public demolition 
decisions, though not by much.  I repeat that I selected hotspot layers that showed the 
most overlaps with demolition points (a best-case scenario bias); a different mix of layers 
will produce different results.
By looking at the two maps, the combined demographic and housing polygons appear un-
expectedly dispersed.  Therefore, these were overlaid as before (maps 15c and 15d), which 
produced 879 points, or just 11.9% of all public demolitions in Philadelphia.  This was 
surprising, because it means public demolitions are prioritized based on housing character-
istics, or on demographic characteristics, but not necessarily both.  But as either housing 
or demographics account for roughly half of all demolitions—and these are under the best-
case scenario, where spatial relationships have best been captured—how is the other half 
of decisions being made?
MAP 15C: Demographic + housing
2008-2012
MAP 15D: Final outcome
2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, US Census, 
Social Explorer
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The “ to what extent”: regression analysis
As previously mentioned, the unit of analysis is the block group, where each polygon has 
been appended with total demolition counts and institutional buffers.  Each variable was 
converted into a proportion (percentage) whenever possible, including demolitions (number 
of demolitions per block group divided by total demolitions for the entire city).  Additional-
ly, institutional buffers were simplified into a binary variable, so that 1 = near (intersecting) 
institution, and 0 = not near institution.
I estimated my first linear regression models based on what I assumed might be significant 
influential variables, and in all cases, the models were heteroscedastic, meaning that the 
variability of these variables were too inconsistent throughout the range of the dependent 
variable (demolitions).  In other words, the error terms showed distinct patterns, rather than 
appearing as evenly-spaced and neutral points across an even band—some other unknown 
factor or variable is possibly influencing this pattern.  The presence of heteroscedasticity 
calls statistical significance into question, though this does not mean it completely 
invalidates the coefficients of each variable in relation to demolitions.  Thus, despite what 
the models show, I hesitate to conclude whether or not the models are statistically 
significant, and cannot reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis that these variables have an 
effect on demolitions.  
Since heteroscedasticity does not invalidate coefficients, I will discuss the findings from 
linear regression models. I attempted to fix heteroscedasticity by respecifying the model in 
various ways, which will follow.  
Rather than estimating models based on assumptions, I tried to break them down between 
housing and demographic characteristics first, and then used those variables that seemed 
to show the greatest statistical significance (probability < 0.05) within the initial models.  In 









Data source: Social Explorer
Neither of the above models had the problem of multicollinearity (highly correlated 
variables); in all cases, VIF was well under 10.  Though residuals for each set of variables 
were distributed around the mean of zero, they did not produce normally-distributed curves 
(seen in the histogram).  The irregularity is made even more apparent in the scatterplots 
showing intense clustering and far outliers, which are nearly identical for both housing and 
demographic characteristics for public demolitions.  




Data source: Social Explorer
Where, “Pub_2201” is percentage of public demolitions, “OwnMedVal” is median house 
values of owner-occupied housing units, “RentMedGross” is median gross rent of rent-
er-occupied units, “OwnAllP” is percentage of owner-occupied housing units, “MoreUnits1” 
is percentage of housing structures with fifty or more units, “BlackP” is percentage of black 
population, “LessHSP” is percentage of those with an educational attainment level less 
than high school, “IncLessPov1” is percentage of those with incomes below the poverty 
line, “Eng_LittleNone1” is percentage of those who either don’t speak English or speak En-
glish “less than well” as defined by the Census, and “nearinstit” is whether or not a demoli-
tion site is within half a mile from a major institution. 
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Ignoring heteroscedasticity for the moment, the model as a whole is statistically signifi-
cant (p-value < 0.05, as indicated by “Prob > F”).  Also note that combining the two factors 
produces a higher R2 (0.2148) than for each individual model, indicating a better fit of the 
variables.  The column “P > l t l” measures the statistical significance of each predictor vari-
able on public demolitions.  This shows that vacancy, black populations, having completed 
less than high school, being below poverty, speaking little to no English, and being near 
an institution have produced statistically significant results (p < 0.05), though this not does 
automatically mean that all other variables should be dismissed.
Since heteroscedasticity has been found to be a problem, it is more useful to discuss each 
of the variables’ coefficients and whether they turned out as expected.
The first thing to note is that none of the coefficients is very large, and therefore, may 
predict public demolitions to a very limited extent.  Because of this, I will focus more on the 
sign of the coefficients:  
 • Vacancies are positively correlated with public demolitions; as vacancy rates  
  increase, so do rates of public demolitions.  This was expected, and shown to  
  be true in the GIS analysis.
 • Median house values are negatively correlated with public demolitions; as 
  values decrease, demolitions tend to increase (very slightly).  This makes   
  sense when considering that this variable refers to owner-occupied units,   
  so assuming that areas with higher home values (and probably property 
  values) indicate wealthier areas, the municipality probably has less need to  
  intervene.  The GIS analysis also shows that public demolitions tend to occur  
  in coldspots, or areas of lower median house values.
 • Median gross rents are also negatively correlated with public demolitions.  A  
  similar logic to median house values is applicable here, which is also 
  supported in the GIS analysis.
 • Owner-occupancy is negatively correlated with public demolitions; when rates  
  of owner-occupancy decrease, public demolition rates increase.  This point
  is made especially salient when considering the fact that about 70% of all  
  L&I’s demolitions between 2011 and 2012 were tax delinquent properties, and  
  that most tax delinquent properties are owned by investors, speculators, and  
  landlords, many of whom are not Philadelphia residents.  
 • Structures with 50 or more housing units are negatively correlated with 
  public demolitions; as rates of larger housing complexes decrease, rates of  
  public demolitions increase.  These types of structures are more prevalent in 
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  downtown Philadelphia, around the wealthier parts of the city, which tend to  
  undergo more development and have more modern housing structures—
  public demolitions would be less expected here.  (Traditionally and even 
  today, Philadelphia is a city of rowhouses and other townhouses.) 
 • Black populations are positively correlated with public demolitions; as 
  population rates increase, so too do demolition rates.  This point needs to be  
  contextualized with economic factors, in that poorer areas tend to have higher  
  concentrations of black populations (and vice versa), and more public 
  demolitions occur here.  The GIS analysis supports this.
 • Educational attainment less than high school is positively correlated with   
  public demolitions.  The explanation above helps make sense of this, in that  
  race and class intersect and must be discussed together.
 • Families living below the poverty line are positively correlated with public   
  demolitions.  See the two preceding points.
 • Little to no English speaking ability is negatively correlated with public 
  demolitions.  I wanted to know if language barriers might have any effects on  
  demolitions, but the results were the opposite of what I had expected.  
  Analyzing this variable showed that the majority of people in this group were  
  Spanish-speakers.  The GIS map above shows a Latino hotspot, and though  
  parts of this area seem to have undergone a lot of demolition, more
  demolitions have happened elsewhere.  
 • Proximity to a major institution is positively correlated with public demolitions,  
  which suggests that municipalities may prioritize work in areas with future 
  development potential, perhaps where “anchor institutions” are present 
  (Mallach and Brachman 2013).
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Philadelphia, private demolitions (final model, using the same steps as above):
	  
Data source: Social Explorer
Where, “t34P” is percentage of residents between the ages of 25 and 34 years, “BlackP” 
is percentage of black population, “BAMoreP” is percentage of those with an educational 
attainment of a bachelor’s degree or higher, “nearinstit” is whether or not a demolition site is 
within a half-mile radius of a major institution, “VacP” is percentage of vacant housing units, 
“OwnMedVal” is median house values of owner-occupied units, “RentMedGross” is median 
gross rent of renter-occupied units, “OwnAllP” is percentage of owner-occupied housing 
units, “UnitDetP” is percentage of 1-unit detached (single-family) structures, and “Older-
Houses1” is percentage of houses built before 1980 (approximately older than thirty years).
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Combining the demographic and housing characteristics also increased the R2 as it had for 
public demolitions, meaning that this is a better fit than demographic or housing character-
istics alone.  Ignoring heteroscedasticity, the overall model, along with the variables of the 
age group of 25 to 34, being near an institution, vacancy, median house values, and older 
house age, are statistically significant.  
A noticeable difference from public demolitions is the distribution curve of residuals, which 
has slightly more spread and is not as heavily concentrated.  
As with public demolitions, the variables’ coefficients are not strongly predictive, so I will 
focus on their direction:
 • The age group of 25 to 34 (representing recent college graduates and 
  members of the “creative class”) is positively correlated with private
  demolitions.  This could mean that developers target areas with a younger  
  workforce (or that younger members of the overall workforce prefer areas 
  undergoing greater development; it is probably a mixture of both).
 • Black populations are negatively correlated with private demolitions, the 
  opposite case for public demolitions.  Considering the correlation between  
  blacks and lower income areas, it makes sense that private developers would  
  tend to avoid poorer neighborhoods that present less profit potential.  
 • Educational attainment of bachelor’s degrees or higher is positively correlated  
  with private demolitions, which makes sense within the context of gentrifying  
  areas where both incomes and education are on the rise.  Development 
  could have been a precursor to gentrification, while gentrification could have  
  spurred on even more development.
 • Proximity to a major institution is negatively correlated with private 
  demolitions.  This is surprising, because I had assumed that being near an  
  institution would have increased development potential.  However, the case  
  could also be that major institutions with greater leverage have been able 
  to get the municipality to do most of or the entire site predevelopment, 
  including demolitions.  Additionally, quasi-public Authorities may work with  
  many of these institutions, and the datasets are not clear on whether these  
  have been counted as public or private work.  
 • Vacancy is positively correlated with private demolitions, which is also 
  somewhat surprising because the GIS analysis does not obviously reflect this.   
  Though it makes sense for private developers to avoid areas of high vacancy  
  related to tax delinquency, it also makes sense for speculators to target areas
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  they believe will soon gentrify and eventually become profitable.  After all,  
  holding property has been a problem in Philadelphia, and has been a major  
  contributor to the tax delinquency problem.  Recall that the original data   
  represent permits, rather than completed work, and importantly, permits did  
  not come with expiration dates (this rule was changed only very recently), so  
  some could reasonably show only an unenthusiastic intent to develop.  
 • Both median house values and median rents are positively correlated with 
  private demolitions, which is the opposite for public demolitions.  Assuming  
  that these stand as a proxy for property values, this relationship makes sense.   
  Fewer private demolitions would reasonably occur in areas with less profit  
  potential. 
 • Owner-occupancy is negatively correlated with private demolitions; areas with  
  a higher proportion of renters may be more attractive to development.  People  
  between the ages of 25 to 34 are more likely to rent than own, so the 
  relationship with owner-occupancy fits into this narrative.
 • Single-family houses (1 unit-detached structures) are negatively correlated  
  with private demolitions.  The GIS analysis shows that hotspots for this type 
  of structure is along the far western and northern borders of the city (with  
  wealthier suburban neighbors).  Center City and the area surrounding have  
  been experiencing the most population growth and development—private  
  development focus has remained in the downtown area.  
 • Older houses (built in 1979 or earlier) are negatively correlated with private  
  demolitions.  I think this means that development has focused on areas 
  already undergoing lots of development, which are the downtown and 
  university areas.
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Camden, public demolitions (final model):
Data source: Social Explorer
	  
Where, “NearInstit” is whether or not a demolition site is within a half-mile radius of a major 
institution, “VacantP” is percentage of vacant housing units, “MedGrossRent” is median 
gross rent of renter-occupied housing units, “IncLessPovP” is percentage of the population 
whose income is below the poverty line, “Age65MoreP” is percentage of the population 
who are 65 years and older, and “MedHHInc” is median household income.
Heteroscedasticity was not quite as severe for Camden 
public demolitions, as they were for Philadelphia, where 
the p-values in all models (“Prob > chi2”) were well below 
0.05 (they were all 0.0000, meaning that the probability 
of the model being heteroscedastic is most certainly not 
due to chance).  Camden’s test for heteroscedasticity 
(image to right), though not satisfactory, fared better.
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The distribution of residuals is also more spread out, though the curve in the histogram 
is not normally-distributed.  I tried experimenting with different variables, but none of the 
curves ever came close to a normal distribution, and consistently resembled the one above. 
Note that the number of observations (n = 62) has been greatly reduced for the regres-
sion, since, as opposed to the GIS analysis, I had to exclude the rest of Camden County.  
Though 62 observations satisfy the generally-accepted minimum sample size of 30 for 
statistical analyses, the number is still on the small size, especially when considering that it 
stands in for a population of almost 80,000 individuals.  In some instances, the GIS 
analysis, which required the addition of the rest of the county, may have made the city 
appear completely homogeneous throughout, but the regression results might suggest that 
there is much more variability.
Ignoring heteroscedasticity, the overall model is statistically significant, and as with Phila-
delphia, combining the demographic and housing characteristics boosted the R2, resulting 
in a better-fit model.  Much fewer variables were used in the final model, however, because 
most were well above the p-value threshold, so I was reluctant to include them.  Because I 
had so few to work with, I did have to increase the threshold somewhat; for the new model, 
being near an institution, vacancy, median gross rent, and poverty are statistically signifi-
cant variables.
In all cases, the variables’ relationship to public demolitions were positively correlated:
 • Proximity to a major institution is the biggest predictor; rates of public 
  demolitions increase when the site is within a half-mile of an institution.  As in  
  the case of Philadelphia, this may hint at a demolition strategy.
 • Demolitions increase as vacancies increase, which was also the case for 
  Philadelphia in both public and private demolitions. 
 • As median gross rents increase, public demolitions also increase.  This result  
  is surprising, but might hint at the fact that the municipality goes for areas with  
  greater redevelopment potential, and not just the worst-off neighborhoods.
 • As poverty rates increase, so too do public demolitions.  When considered  
  against the result for median rent, this is does not seem to make sense—it  
  now suggests that demolitions do target areas of greatest need rather than  
  development potential.
 • As the retirement-aged (65 and above) population increases, demolitions also  
  increase.  Census data show, however, that the 65 and above age group is  
  not really a significant proportion of the population, and are likely not being  
  “targeted” by the city.  It could be that most 65 and above just happen to be
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  living below the poverty line, paying higher rents, living in high vacancy areas,  
  or living near a major institution.
 • Public demolitions increase as median household incomes increase.  This  
  supports the relationship for median gross rent, but opposes the poverty 
  relationship.
For other regression models and diagnostics, see appendix.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION
The central question of this thesis asks just how well policy and practice stack up against 
each other, in terms of demolition in shrinking cities.  The neighboring cities of Philadelphia 
and Camden have had similar pasts, in that post-industrialization and suburbanization had 
severely diminished each city’s population and economic power, and stunted their positions 
as potential “global cities.”  As a result of differing local, state, and even federal manage-
ment (or mismanagement), the cities have been led on paths placing them even further 
apart.  And despite attempts to regionalize and work more collaboratively (the Philadel-
phia-Camden-Wilmington area is also known unofficially as the “Delaware Valley”), it seems 
that Philadelphia is now en route to its renaissance, while Camden continues to struggle, 
not only with its actual past, but also with its generally negative portrayal in the media. 
Analyzing the history of planning and demolition policies of Camden revealed that, even 
though officials appeared to be aware of their shrinking reality, even acknowledging it, plans 
have remained fundamentally growth-oriented.  At the heart of all plans is the hope that 
new residents will be attracted to the city, rather than prioritizing the needs and wants of 
current residents.  Camden has been severely losing people and tax revenue for the better 
part of half a century, yet even as recent as the 2002 master plan, officials believed that 
they could attract 20,000 new residents, which would have been a 20% increase to their 
80,000 citizens around that time.  After another decade, this goal has not been met, howev-
er; the population has actually declined even further.  
Plans and documents also seem to overwhelmingly focus on housing over jobs.  The 
Census data clearly show that Camdenites have been struggling financially for a very long 
time.  One of the plans proclaimed a big-box retail center as a good thing for Camden, 
though the neighboring suburb of Cherry Hill already has a large mall, and big-box retail 
does not always provide living wage jobs with opportunities for advancement.  Therefore, 
this strategy is questionable, and again, brings up the concern of what and who are really at 
the heart of Camden’s planning process?
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This ambiguity is reflected in the analyses, especially in the regression analysis.  A lack of 
demolition strategy in Camden, and therefore barriers to redevelopment, have already been 
acknowledged in the past.  Even with HUD and other federal grants, it is not clear that a 
strategy exists even now.  Two city officials I had spoken with concurred, since an immedi-
ate emergency, especially in a city with limited funds to begin with, will necessarily trump 
any long-term strategy.  As for the non-emergency demolitions, the original data showed 
that areas were indeed targeted.  For example, ten adjacent addresses were demolished 
within the same month.  However, there is no further information as to what the reasons are 
for mass demolitions, or what purpose the site will serve in the future.  In some cases, mass 
demolition sites have remained vacant for so long that they now appear as fields with 
untouched vegetation.  For Camden, whose population has undeniably shrunken and with 
few hopeful signs of growth, perhaps handing over dilapidated, dangerous, and value-
diminishing structures back to the ecosystem is truly the “highest and best use.”  
Focusing on demolition over rehabilitation of unsound structures is arguably a better use 
of funds in this city.  Though rehabilitation tends to cost less, any benefit from cost savings 
becomes moot when market demand simply isn’t strong enough to justify saving decaying 
structures that may continue to sit vacant and fall into a state of disrepair again.  Though 
demolition is costlier, thoughtful and strategic action could allow the city to direct future 
development, through site preparation and assemblage.  The problem, again, is lack of 
market demand, along with the fact that the city has seemingly lost control of any sort of 
demolition or planning strategy (and its ability to govern its own citizens and itself).  Cam-
den’s “legacy” is non-existent or forgotten at best, and downright negative and prejorative 
at worst, which the media often reinforces: “In the cases of at least three mayors in the last 
30 years, the most noteworthy thing politicians have done is go to jail” (DeLuca 2013).  The 
shining light in Camden has been the nonprofits and grassroots organizations that have 
been taking over vacant and abandoned properties, renovating them, and re-selling them to 
current residents at reasonable prices.  The municipality recognizes their work in the com-
munity, but it would be interesting to see how (and if) they actually work together.    
Philadelphia also recognized its situation as a shrinking city, but unlike Camden, it seems to 
have put more energy into neighborhood revitalization over redevelopment for the purpose 
of attracting new residents.  The Neighborhood Transformation Initiative clearly announced 
this intention.  At the same time, however, this document fell into the housing over jobs 
conundrum, like Camden.  While outdated, unlivable, and unsafe housing structures should 
be removed or dealt with in some way, NTI had proposed to use all its funding for 
housing-related endeavors.  Again, what about jobs?  Ultimately, I think NTI failed to reach 
its goals because it was too one-dimensional, and could not stand on its own—it was more 
like a bandage for the symptoms, but did not do enough to treat the disease.  
Is cracking down on tax delinquency and increasing funding for L&I a way to treat to the 
vacancy and abandonment disease in Philadelphia?  Potentially, but it is too soon to tell. 
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The city’s population appears to be on the rise, gaining both people and attention, but the 
unemployment and poverty rates are still downright dismal, and have increased since 2000.  
Thus, according to some definitions and theories, as discussed previously, Philadelphia is 
still a shrinking city and should tread carefully while in its tenuous position.  In order to 
foster any newcomers or future growth potential, it would be wise for the municipality to 
galvanize its dedication to serving current residents and meeting current needs, as it had 
been claiming to do for the past years.  Meeting current needs entails stabilizing the city’s 
economy and unemployment rates, and thinking smarter and more strategically about 
economic growth for current residents—throughout the city and not just the downtown.  
Construction permits have been up recently, and signs of development are obvious in the 
desirable parts of town.  Though the temptation for Philadelphia might be to capitalize on 
any recent growth, and be pro-development, the danger here is that it might be too soon to 
erect so many new office towers and residential complexes, based on population numbers 
alone.  Additionally, promoting “economic development” could easily promote uneven 
development in a city that is already economically and socially uneven.  For Philadelphia, 
now is the crucial time to ensure that the city’s working definition of “economic develop-
ment” does not exacerbate the problem, but that it faithfully ensures more integration and 
equity instead.
The data have not clearly and unquestionably reflected the latter and more optimistic eco-
nomic development strategy.  The benefit of having private demolition data, however, could 
help explain the patterns that public demolitions took between 2008-2012 in Philadelphia.  
It appears that the city has a two-fold strategy, which responds to both immediate emer-
gency need and future market demand.
The following vacancy maps from the GIS analysis section illustrate the strategy.  The 
orange circles highlight the intense clustering of public demolitions (left map) in a very small 
and isolated location, which, as seen in the map to the right, is an area covered in private 
demolitions (high development area).  As the previous analyses also showed, this isolated 
location is also poorer than its surroundings, and generally does not seem to “fit in.”  In this 
case, it appears that the city’s demolition strategy is that of site preparation and assem-
blage.  The map on the right also shows that some private demolitions also appear in this 
location.  
Similarly, the blue circles also indicate a public demolition strategy of site preparation and 
assemblage, as well as responses to immediate needs and public safety.  The University of 
Pennsylvania and Drexel University are to the right of the triangle (Fairmount Park) in West 
Philadelphia, and Temple University’s sprawling campus of buildings is to the left, in North 
Philadelphia.  These schools are directly adjacent to and interlaced with very low-
income areas, which is likely why there has been any private demolition at all.  The schools’ 
presence and expanding campuses could also explain the intensity of public demolition 
clustering, as sites are being prepared for future development.  The further spread of public
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MAP 9A: Vacant + public demolitions, 
2008-2012
MAP 9B: Vacant + private demolitions, 
2008-2012
demolitions to the west and north of the schools (where there are very few, if any, private 
demolitions) may also indicate that the municipality is responding to public safety needs in 
poorer areas that have much less development potential in the eyes of the private sector.  
With a larger operating budget, greater autonomy of the city government, and increased 
interest from the private sector, it is not surprising that Philadelphia is able to carry such a 
two-pronged demolition strategy.  The larger question is whether this strategy, with a great-
er emphasis either on site predevelopment or public safety, is good for current Philadelphia 
citizens, and what kinds of impacts it will have in a city that has just started to stabilize 
in some respects (population numbers), but that still has a long way to go in meeting the 
needs of current residents (economic stability).  The former Licenses and Inspections 
Commissioner, Bennett Levin, criticized the department for prioritizing economic develop-
ment over its real purpose—public safety—and attributed it to last year’s tragic building 
collapse.  Must economic development come at the cost of the public’s welfare?  
The reality of both cities is that they have lost massive numbers of residents in the past 
decades, and as a result, have more vacant buildings than people who actually want to live 
in them.  As years, and even decades pass, vacancy soon becomes an issue of blight, pub-
lic safety, and a loss of wealth due to diminished property values for surrounding residents.  
Eventually, they must be dealt with, and there are two options: demolish at a higher cost
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or rehabilitate at a cost savings.  The choice is not clear-cut, however, since rehabilitation 
can still be quite costly, especially for row houses (of which both Camden and Philadelphia 
have plenty), and which would ultimately negate any cost savings if no one were willing to 
purchase the rehabbed structures.  Demolition has typically been thought of as the more 
expensive and riskier, and therefore, undesirable choice, but this view has slowly been 
shifting, thanks in large part to the initiatives that shrinking cities have been taking as they 
experiment with new tools to reframe planning principals.  Because the reality is that there 
simply are not enough people to fill out all the buildings, why is there a need for buildings to 
fill out the entire city landscape?  
In some cases, public demolitions are project-specific and are necessary precursors to a 
slated development.  In the other extreme, demolitions are necessary for public safety if 
the building is deemed imminently dangerous, and unless there is a specific reuse for the 
site, it may remain a vacant lot for a number of years.  Other researchers have shown that 
vacant lots, either left vacant for wild vegetation or turned into community gardens, can 
be extremely beneficial in shrinking cities, both ecologically and socially.  In poorer neigh-
borhoods, community gardens may provide important social connections and networking 
opportunities, while providing crucial side income; they may also be the closest sources 
of reliable and fresh produce.  Clearly, there is a recognition of such benefits stemming 
from vacant lots, in Philadelphia in particular, as evidenced by the work undertaken by the 
Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (PHS) in adopting, rehabbing, and promoting the uses of 
vacant lots throughout the city.  
Finally, demolition may be another important tool for taking back command of the city, as 
it rebounds from decades of hardship, as in the case of Philadelphia.  Demolition, if used 
strategically and equitably in terms of economic development, can even be a potential 
advantage of shrinking cities to control and direct where future development will occur, if 
public demolitions do indeed precede private development.  The municipality, in wielding 
the demolition tool, has the potential to beneficially impact current residents, especial-
ly in lower-income areas containing the most severe vacant and derelict structures.  The 
flipside is that the city could choose to favor areas that only have development potential, 
which tend not to be the mostly residential and poorer West and North Philadelphia neigh-
borhoods outside the scope of major institutions.  Demolition, especially in the context of 
shrinking cities, requires a delicate balance unique to each city.  It is highly questionable 
whether Camden is anywhere near finding that balance, as it marches forth, seemingly 
mechanically, to patch up issues as they arise and when money allows.  Philadelphia is 
perhaps a bit closer, having had the luxury to direct demolition in more meaningful and 
decisive ways, and the effects of which continue to unfold—both good and bad. 
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Housing structures with 50 units or 
more, 2008-2012
Ages 65 and greater, 2008-2012
Ages 25 to 44, 2008-2012 Speaks no English or speaks“less than 
well”, 2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP GIS, 
US Census, Social Explorer
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Older housing units (built before 1980), 
2008-2012
Sources: Dept. of Licenses and Inspections (Philadelphia), 
Department of Public Works (Camden), DVRPC, PASDA, NJDEP 
GIS, US Census, Social Explorer
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APPENDIX B: OTHER REGRESSION MODELS & DIAGNOSTICS
The preceding regression analyses were based on linear models, which assume a linear 
relationship between the variables.  Though other models may be more accurate, I decided 
to show just these, for the sake of simplicity, and because my biggest concern was hetero-
scedasticity, which none of the other models were able to resolve anyway.  I tried 
respecifying the model using a logistic regression, in which I converted the demolition data 
into dummy variables, where 1 = demolition* and 0 = no demolition.  The odds ratios 
produced nothing meaningful, so I decided not to use this.  
I also did simple scatterplots of all the predictor variables with the demolition data to see if 
they looked to have polynomial relationships, or where relationships were not 1:1.  I 
converted the variables that looked to have such a relationship (simply x * x to produce x2), 
and then used these in the regression model, but this was also a dead end in terms of 
heteroscedasticity.  Next, I created interaction terms that I thought might be significant, 
such as black x poverty, but again, this did not resolve heteroscedasticity.
Finally, since I was using Census data, which cover continuous spaces, I was sure that 
autocorrelation would be a problem in a simple multivariate regression model, and the 
single biggest reason for heteroscedasticity.  Spatial autocorrelation means that neighbors 
have an effect on the subject in question (a block group polygon, in this case), which much 
be taken into consideration.  Using GeoDa, which is a free, downloadable mapping and 
regression platform, I created spatial weights, which the software generates automatically, 
and used a spatial lag model.  In general, the R2, or model fit, increased by about 0.1, but 
heteroscedasticity remained a problem.
After all these attempts, the only conclusion I was left with was that the data simply was not 
enough to confidently predict demolitions for either city.  As I had stated in the limitations 
section, crime and actual property value/tax assessment data would have been ideal, and 
could be the missing “third variable” to better explain the models and results.  
* For public demolitions, I set demolition equal to 1 when there were two or more 
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